administrative receivership as being "widely regarded as giving an unhealthy amount of power to creditors holding floating charges, who because of their secured status lacked sufficient incentives to rescue failing companies." 6 In this paper, I consider the implications of allocating control to a lender. Drawing inferences from the literature on the theory of the firm, I uncover the existence of lender control costs beyond conflict of interests due to claimholders with priority differences.
The priority differences' cosmology stems from a view of the firm as composed by explicit contracts. Breaking away from that paradigm allows us to identify other sources of lender control costs not tied to priority differences between classes of claimholders.
Specifically, I show that even when there is only one class of legal claimholders, lender control may generate suboptimal results due to the suboptimal investment incentives that parties not fully covered by explicit contracts may have.
In addition, I argue that broadening the definition of the firm sheds light on the role of lender control and functionally related theories (i.e. equitable subordination) of liability. These theories had been criticized by academics and practitioners alike due to the dire consequences they pose on lending, 7 while their role has been dwarfing. In particular, widening the definition of the theory of the firm allows us to visualize that lender control liability should serve to penalize self-serving behavior which runs counter to the optimal use of the assets.
Finally, I discuss the strict nature of lender control liability and its relation to cognitive errors. The ordinary understanding is that lender control triggers harmful strict lender liability. Therefore, lender control liability should be heavily limited or even suppressed so that the efficient lending is not precluded. I argue that the strict nature of lender control liability may avoid inefficiencies deriving from hindsight bias, but that hindsight is not the only cognitive error distorting adjudicators. A closer look at anchoring's role in damage assessments, permits to refocus policy recommendations and help explain the shortcomings of strict liability in this context. This paper proceeds as follows. Part II, discusses the predominant as well as competing theories of the firm and their implications for lender control evaluations. Part III, presents a model to show lender control costs even when there's only one class of legal claimants to the firm assets. Part IV, investigates rationales behind the dwarfing role of lender liability theories in the United States and argues that it is in part due to the misconception that freedom of contracts will always generate socially optimal results.
Part V, shows that fears of adjudication errors due to hindsight bias in the context of lender control liability theories are somewhat misplaced and that policy oriented recommendations should focus not only on hindsight bias but also on anchoring. Part VI provides concluding remarks.
II. The Explicit Nexus of Contracts Paradigm
Knowing what constitutes a firm is important, both for healthy and distressed firms, as a way to understand whether it is beneficial to have a firm and whether allocation of control influences efficiency. 8 Originally, the firm was viewed in terms of the technological transformations a firm was capable of doing, 9 focusing on the maximization of the production function of the firm. 10 Milgrom and Roberts suggest that 8 In previous work, I have discussed extensively different theories of the firm and their implications for value and control. See Sergio A. Muro "Bankruptcy Control and the Theory of the Firm", unpublished manuscript, on file with the author. 9 See Sidney G. Winter "On Coase, Competence, and the Corporation", 4 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 163, 164 (1988) . For an early presentation of the neoclassical viewpoint, see Jacob Viner "Cost Curves and Supply Curves", 3 Zeitschrift für National-ökonomie 23 (1932) . Hart considers that "A manager presides over this production set, buying and selling inputs and outputs in a spot market and choosing the plan that maximizes owners' welfare." See Oliver Hart "An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm", 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1757 Rev. , 1759 Rev. (1989 . 10 See Sidney G. Winter "On Coase, Competence, and the Corporation", 4 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 163, 164 (1988) . Holmstrom and Tirole argue that the theory of the firm in neoclassical terms just asked "what forces ensure that the process will maximize profits". See Bengt R. Holmstrom & Jean Tirole "The Theory of the Firm", 1 Handbook of Industrial Organization 61, 63 (1989) .
this "neoclassical theory" looked at market failures in competitive environments to find reasons for non-market organizations (i.e. market power, increasing returns to scale, externalities, coordination problems, etc).
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Later advances replaced this conceptualization by what Zingales refers to as the "explicit nexus of contracts theory", 12 which is the prevalent view of the firm in corporate finance. 13 It originated with Alchian and Demsetz's 14 study where input from different individuals cannot be verified while output can. As free riding would emerge, their solution involved allowing one person to monitor the venture, pay the other individuals fixed amounts and receive all the residual claims from the firm. 15 Jensen and Meckling 16 contributed greatly to this approach by describing the firm as a legal fiction tying a set of contractual relations together. 17 As a result, the firm boundaries' are set by the costs the monitor incurs in controlling that the agents perform according to the contracts.
18
As all contracts are assumed to be explicit, the explicit nexus of contracts theory considers that each constituent, except for the shareholders, is fully paid its opportunity cost. Therefore, a firm cannot be worth more than the sum of contracts it unites 19 and shareholders, as only residual claimants, need to be allocated the decision rights. 20 In the same vein, only shareholder interests should be pursued by the firm. As a corollary consequence, in order to value the firm, computing only legal claims' prices is relevant.
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The explicit nexus of contracts theory is widespread through law academia and court opinions. For example, in the law literature, Easterbrook and Fischel, when they discuss voting, consider that "The right to vote is the right to make all the decisions not otherwise provided by contract -whether the contract is express or supplied by legal rules", 22 implying that residual powers need merely be with the only class possessing residual rights: the shareholders. As for judicial decisions, an example can be observed in the recent opinion Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 23 where the Chancery Court of Delaware while considering the existence of duties towards creditors in vicinity of insolvency expressed that "So long as directors are respectful of the corporation's obligation to honor the legal rights of its creditors, they should be free to pursue in good faith profit for the corporation's equityholders", 24 implying that other constituents besides shareholders are paid their full opportunity cost.
nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by the existence of divisible residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be sold without permission of the other contracting individuals. Although this definition of the firm has little substantive content, emphasizing the essential contractual nature of firms and other organizations focuses attention on a crucial set of questions-why particular sets of contractual relations arise for various types of organizations, what the consequences of these contractual relations are, and how they are affected by changes exogenous to the organization. Viewed this way, it makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things that are "inside" the firm (or any other organization) from those things that are "outside" of it." See Michael C. Jensen and Meckling's observed that if shareholders of an over-leveraged firm (i.e. debt over asset ratio over 1) are at the helm, they will have incentives to over-invest in high variance projects leaving them to enjoy potential benefits and the creditors to suffer potential losses. Myers' uncovered the underinvestment problem. He described a firm's investment opportunity as call options whose likelihood of being exercised depends on the conflict of interests between debtholders and shareholders. As debtholders had a cap on maximum recovery, if they were at the helm they would disregard opportunities that made them suffer losses in bad scenarios without letting them enjoy the benefits in the good scenarios, regardless of the net present value of the project. Therefore, debtholders' control over investment policy may lead to underinvestment. Empirical studies linking firm characteristics to financial policy decisions suggest the accuracy of those theories.
27
Aghion and Bolton extended this line of work to show that ex ante efficiency is advanced by allocating control contingent in the financial signals of the firm.
28
Relying on theoretical implications of the explicit nexus of contracts theory, Baird Rev. 1905 Rev. , 1920 Rev. -1 (2004 Rev. 751, 778 (2002) . 31 See David A. Skeel, Jr. "Creditors' Ball: The "New" New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11", 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 917, 920 (2003) 32 In this regard, Jensen notes that "It is logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension at the same time unless the dimensions are what are known as "monotonic transformations" of one another. Thus, telling a manager to maximize current profits, market share, future growth in profits, and anything else one pleases will leave that manager with no way to make a reasoned decision. Chicago (1988) , at 33-56. They contended that firms usually rely on implicit contracts which the company must be trusted to respect. To the extent that long term contracts reduce costs, such trustworthiness is a valuable asset to the firm. The need for long term contracts derives from the equal need to promote firm specific investment. The problem is that even if ex ante efficient, in certain states of the world it will be ex post efficient to breach those contracts. Hence, ex post cost breaching needs to be measured against ex ante increase in cost (plus it is more likely to be, at least in part, a redistribution of wealth than anything else). The preceding discussion suggests that control allocation under different theories of the firm may not be innocuous towards incentives beyond mere balancing of agency costs of different set of claimants. The next section will look at control allocation costs abandoning the explicit nexus of contracts paradigm and will show the existence of other costs that need to be taken into account before advancing a definite judgment on the desirability of lender control.
III. Single class of claimants and lender control costs

A. A Simple Model
In this section, I intend to specifically tie the notions of lender control and the theory of the firm in bankruptcy. I present a stylized model drawing from previous work by Hart, 45 to illustrate ineffiencies that may arise in reorganization under lender control.
The focus of this section is different from previous work on the matter because it focuses on lender control costs where there is only one class of legal claimants. The existence of more than one class of legal claimants has been shown to be the source of inefficiencies in bankruptcy. 46 Hence, I will show that assignment of property rights in reorganization 43 See Luigi Zingales "In search for New Foundations", 55 Journal of Finance 1623 Finance , 1635 Finance (2000 . 44 proceedings, I assume that there is only one class of legal claimants, the lender in control (LC) who owns all the debt claims to the firm, and another party, an independent service provider (SP), who has the ability to make relationship specific investments. The existence of only one source of legal claimants could be interpreted as a situation where a firm is so heavily indebted that there is not any plausible scenario under which the lender could be fully paid. Alternatively, it could be understood as a situation where one person provided all the financing to the firm, as a result being the only equity and debt holder for a business which due to a potent financial shock is currently worth a lot less than the face value of debt. 49 It is important to note that SP is not an employee of the debtor and therefore will not generate a claim to salary under the model. This feature of the model is not essential, but serves the purpose of highlighting the existence of control related costs where there's only one class of legal claimants.
50
At the outset of the model, I am denying the possibility that controlling lenders can make any relationship specific investments. Although I acknowledge that this is an extreme assumption, there are reasons to believe that it is closely related to lending practices. At least in the US, lenders focus seems to be on assessing the viability of Rev. 917 (2003) . 48 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang "Bargaining and the division of value in Corporate Reorganization", 8 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 253 (1992) 49 Notice that this interpretation doesn't necessarily mean that the business was originally undercapitalized.
It is conceivable that a financially healthy business from the onset may become bankrupt after losses and/or a financial shock. 50 In fact, very little would change if SP was an employee with a fixed salary. This presentation is admittedly extreme, in the sense that no part of the relationship between LC and SP is subject to an explicit contract at date 1. The debtor firm has only one asset producing a profit with certainty (alternatively, all the assets of the firm can be thought as a unity where the ability to work with them is either given or not). This bankruptcy reorganization model has two periods, 1 and 2. In period 1, SP chooses an action e representing relationship specific investment which generates a total return at date 2 equal to the value of the firm V(e). SP's action cannot be observed by any other person and makes him incur a private cost equal to e. 54 In the case that SP does not invest (e=0) then at period 2 firm value is V(0). 55 The previous depiction of the reorganization time frame is entirely plausible given the reported length of US chapter 11 proceedings. For example, Carapeto found the length of the proceedings for firms reorganizing after the proposal of the first plan to be on average 272 days, while for firms where more than one plan was proposed the average length was 524 days. Rev. 159, 178 (1997) ("When questioned about their reticence to repossess collateral, the account executives uniformly pointed to the general success of allowing the debtor to sell the collateral: the executives ordinarily expect to get full repayment if they leave collateral in the debtor's possession and rarely expect to get full repayment if they do not. Surprisingly, that perception seems to be well justified.") 54 It is assumed that SP does not have any financial constraints which would force him to invest a level of e inferior to his first best option. 55 When e=0, LC and SP do not enter into an agreement in date 2 and LC obtains the 100% of V(0 Following Grossman and Hart, 58 there is an action involving the asset which can be taken at date 2 but cannot be specified in the contract at date 1. This generates contractual incompleteness, in turn making residual control rights relevant as whoever is in control will be able to obtain a share of any possible benefits arising out of a consensual transaction. To show this contractual incompleteness, it is assumed that whoever is in control always obtains a non-verifiable fraction (1-α) of V(e), where 0<α<1. This (1-α) fraction of firm value may be interpreted as if the controlling lender presents a reorganization plan where the value of the firm is underscored, so that he can obtain a larger portion of resulting business' equity. Indeed, (1-α) speaks about one of the most significant problems in bankruptcy, determining firm value, one that the United
States reorganization scheme was designed to sidestep.
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The remaining share αV(e) is verifiable, and therefore contractible upon in the second period. As a result, a contract between LC and SP can only consist of a division of the firm's verifiable return or profits, π=αV(e). As only π is verifiable, SP's reward upon trading depends on it and is represented by a fraction βπ, where 0<β≤1 is the rule the parties adopted on the division of any profits arising out of a transaction in period 2.
In order to maximize social efficiency and regardless of who is in control, the investment should work to maximize V(e)-e. As LC controls the firm, SP settles at date 1 for a level of e knowing that LC will obtain at least the fraction of value (1-α)V(e) and maybe more depending on LC's bargaining power. Therefore, SP works to maximize his http://www.law.duke.edu/conference/triangle/morrison_chapter11.pdf (last visited 5/02/07) (reporting that firms stay in bankruptcy an average of 15 months) 57 Ergo, V'(e)>0 and V"(e)<0. 58 See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration", 94 Journal of Political Economy 691, 696 (1986) ("We have in mind a situation in which it is prohibitively difficult to think about and describe unambiguously in advance how all the potentially relevant aspects of the production allocation should be chosen as a function of the many states of the world"). 59 One of the principal innovations of the Bankruptcy Code was to use voting in Chapter 11 in order to avoid the need for the court to perform cumbersome valuations.
private benefit βαV(e)-e. It follows that because β≤1 (which is the case as (1-α)V(e) is not contractible) SP will not capture the full value deriving from his effort. Contrasting this case to the one where SP controls the firm 60 and invests in order to maximize both the verifiable and non-verifiable part
(1-α)V(e)+αV(e)-e confirms the intuition that in the former scenario SP's investment decision will not be socially optimal. 61 Only when SP controls the firm's asset the investment level allows achieving the first-best.
This simple model shows that, under conditions of contractual incompleteness (which allow value divertion) and relationship specific investments, the value of a firm may heavily depend on control allocation. In fact, Hart states that giving the party capable of making a value enhancing relationship specific investment "entitlement to the asset's profit stream will not be enough since an outside owner may be able to divert some of the asset's return for his own uses, thus dulling the manager's incentives." 62 In the same spirit, Blair and Stout state, while discussing the importance of legal personality of corporations, that "Specific investment is discouraged when individual investors have a legal right to prematurely withdraw their contributions (and with it, the ability to opportunistically threaten to withdraw in order to "hold up" their fellow investors in an attempt to extract a larger share of the surplus generated by corporate activity)."
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B. Relaxing the restriction on the number of claimholders
Allowing for the introduction of more than one class of claimholders, or even just more than one claimholder in the same class, does not provide a rosier picture. 719, 730 (2006) reorganization in two ways: it makes C the maximum LC can obtain from (1-β)αV(e); in addition the maximum LC will be able to divert to himself from underscoring the value of reorganization is also capped. The cap on the divertion amount is also derived from C, and follows from
is the maximum percentage of stock assignable to LC under a reorganization plan. The relative importance of the cap on a controlling lender is apparent. For corporate bankruptcies in the second part of 2001, Ayotte and Morrison report that ratio of secured debt to assets in the filing schedules was 0.65. This figure likely represents a higher bound on the ratio as there is a significant drop in the value of the assets reported in the last 10-K relative to the figure reported in the bankruptcy schedules. 64 Unfortunately, these effects are not beneficial to SP or more generally any party making relationship specific investments (unless the intersection of the set of relationship specific investors and the set of other claimholders is non empty). Further, they may be prejudicial as it makes any liquidation strategy (usually generating smaller returns) more attractive to LC as his benefits from reorganization are reduced. In turn, making the liquidation strategy more appealing to LC boosts his bargaining position, which generally means that β is smaller and negatively affects SP's ex ante investment.
The analysis above did not take into account an additional factor which is at the heart of lender control: security interests. 65 As long as LC is over-secured his ability to gain from any growth in V(e) in good states of the world, as mentioned earlier, is partly reaped by other claimholders. The other claimholders, though, do not share in the same 64 The mean value of assets reported in the last 10-K in their sample was 122.81 millions, while the median value of the assets reported in the bankruptcy schedules was 37.34 millions. business plan at all and little funds. In the case of these entrepreneurs, the success of their ventures depends heavily on opportunistic adaptation, rather than merely following ex ante ideas. As a result, it appears that VC firms in their attempt to limit conflict of interests also restrict the set of growth opportunities.
Most likely, the same scenario appears with a lender in control. Conditional on the conjecture of similarity between distressed and start-ups' firms, controlling lenders of distressed firms will tend to constrain more business plan changes or adaptations limiting the ability of distressed firms to gain on unexpected opportunities. The fundamental reason behind the adaptation ability difference is the relatively poorer ability of a controlling lender to attribute unexpected events to the right causes due in large part to 66 
D. Summary
I have shown that broadening the view of the theory of the firm permits to see that lender control poses costs non-investigated before. In addition, the above discussion shows that lender control social costs are boosted by the costs of lender control discovered under the nexus of explicit contracts. Finally, I exposed the fact that lender control may also constrain the investment opportunity set in order to exclude sizable business plan changes. Therefore, when considering control allocations in lengthy processes as chapter 11, the above analysis suggest that having a controlling lender at the helm may be as bad as having equityholders there. It follows that policymakers reflecting on bankruptcy reform should try to move beyond either possibility. The following section uses these intuitions to argue that lender control liability should serve to penalize selfserving behavior which runs counter to the optimal use of the assets.
IV. Lender control liability and functionally related theories
As the previous section has shown, DIP lender control may generate ex ante inefficient investment even in the absence of conflict of interests between legal claimholders. This section argues that the theory of the firm is further useful in providing a rationale for lender control liability and functionally related theories whose role has been dwarfed under current interpretations. 110 Yale L.J. 387, 407 (2000) ("The default rules of property and contract law in effect provide that, absent contractual agreement to the contrary, each of the entrepreneur's creditors has an equal-priority floating lien upon the entrepreneur's entire pool of assets as a guarantee of performance.") 83 See In The Matter of Mobile Steel Company, 563 F2d 692, 699-700 (3 rd Circuit, 1977 ) ("… three conditions must be satisfied before exercise of the power of equitable subordination is appropriate. (i) The claimant must have engaged in some type of inequitable conduct; (ii) The misconduct must have resulted in injury to the creditors of the bankrupt or conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant; (iii) Equitable subordination of the claim must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.") 84 See "Restatement of the Law Third, Agency", American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul, Minnesota Vol. 1 p. 17 (2006) . The Restatement defines agency as a "fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a "principal") manifests assent to another person (an "agent") that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act" 85 For example, Professor Lawrence has considered that "Lender control is neither illegal nor inherently bad. Control, however, is easily subjected to a variety of excesses and abuses, so legal responses are justified to keep such behavior in check." See William H. Lawrence "Lender Control Liability: An Analytical Model Illustrated with Applications to the Relational Theory of Secured Financing", 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1387 Rev. , 1390 Rev. (1989 Circuit, 1987) , where the court reversed a summary judgment which considered that Citibank (the lender) was not a principal of Data Lease (the debtor) ("In determining whether an agency relationship exists between Citibank and the third party defendants, the key issue is control and domination… In his deposition, Joseph Stefan made the following admission: Q. Did you work for Citibank? A. At the bottom of everything the answer would be yes. They put me there and they took me out. Stefan further testified that he worked in close coordination with Citibank on "major matters", including major changes of policy. Finally, Stefan described his displeasure with Miami National's head of operations and his inability to remove the man from office: Q. Why couldn't you get rid of Mr. Connor? A. He was there at the wishes of Citibank and they would have to remove him. ", Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Financial Corporation, 828 F.2d 686, 102 "A relationship is one of agency only if the person susceptible to dominance or influence has consented to act on behalf of the other and the other has a right of control, not simply an ability to bring influence to bear." See "Restatement of the Law Third, Agency", American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul, Minnesota Vol. 1 p. 28 (2006) . A similar test can be found for example in Chemtool, Inc. v. Lubricant Technologies Inc. noting that "the test to determine whether a principal-agent relationship exists is whether the alleged principal has the right to control the agent, and whether the alleged agent can affect the legal relationships of the principal. " See Chemtool, Inc. v. Lubricant Technologies Inc., 148 F.3d 742 (7 th Circuit, 1998) . This consensual characteristic sets apart the agency definition of control from the definitions of power in the social sciences. For example, Professor Dowding classifies power in outcome power, "the ability of an actor to bring about or help to bring about outcomes" and social power, "the ability of an actor deliberately to change the incentive structure of another actor or actors to bring about or help to bring about outcomes", without any references to consent or assent as the Restatement section 1 comment f does. See Keith Dowding "Power", University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN (1996) , at 5. 103 See Thomas Pearson v. Component Technology Corporation; General Electric Capital Corporation, 247 F.3d 471, 506 (3 rd Circuit, 2001 
B. Beyond the Explicit Nexus of Contracts Paradigm
In this subsection, I argue that, at least in part, the previously described "control disconnect" derives from an understanding of the theory of the firm similar to the explicit nexus of contracts theory. As it was noted in section II, the explicit nexus of contracts theory looks at firms as mere ways of connecting contracts which fully pay everyone but 417-8 (2001 ) ("Our analysis shows that bankers tend to be on the boards of firms in which shareholdercreditor conflicts are likely to be relatively unimportant. Typically, these firms are large and stable and have a high fraction of tangible assets and a low level of short-term financing in their capital structure… At low levels of risk, the benefits of monitoring appear to dominate, while at higher levels of risk, the conflict of interest costs and lender liability concerns become more important." "There is an important tradeoff in the U.S. between the benefits to firms of active monitoring and the costs of potential conflicts of interest and lender liability"). In addition, the use of chapter 11 sales is indicative of measures taken to avoid lender control liability. 112 In addition, it could be claimed that the recent escalation of cases claiming "deepening insolvency" has been a practical answer to courts closing the lender control liability possibility. On the escalation deepening insolvency cases, see Gerald L. Blanchard "Recent Developments in the Area of Lender Liability Law", Ann. Surv. of Bankr. Law Part I S 3 (2006) ("the year saw continued development in the area of deepening insolvency"). 113 See Luigi Zingales "In search for New Foundations", 55 Journal of Finance 1623 Finance , 1630 Finance (2000 . 114 For example, when Fischel discusses damages arising due to lender liability he says that "the relationship between a lender and a borrower is contractual." See Daniel R. Fischel "The Economics of Lender Liability", 99 Yale L. J. 131, 148 (1989) . Also, when considering the source of liability, Fischel looks at opportunistic behavior: "Opportunistic behavior occurs whenever one party attempts to obtain, at the expense of the other, a benefit not contemplated by the initial agreement, either explicitly or implicitly. Thus, whenever a lender attempts to renegotiate with the borrower for better terms when there is no basis for doing so, the lender is behaving opportunistically". See Daniel R. Fischel "The Economics of Lender Liability", 99 Yale L. J. 131, 138 (1989) . Even though Fischel talks about implicit contract terms, he doesn't view the existence of non-contractability as a possibility, as on this particular point he relies on the analysis of Muris, who explicitly considers that "the victim would have avoided the problem [of opportunism] so long as the costs of prevention were less than the expected costs of the opportunism." See Timothy J. Muris "Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts", 65 Minn. L. Rev. 521, 524 (1981) .
is not achieved. Following this logic, it comes to no surprise to encounter claims like the ones found in the Kham Shoes or Trenwick opinions cited above.
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The above description of freedom of contracts when combined with the explicit nexus of contracts paradigm and agency law's negative control safe harbor is misleading. Circuit, 1990 ) ("In sum, we conclude that § 510(c)(1) authorizes courts to equitably subordinate claims to other claims on a case-by-case basis without requiring in every instance inequitable conduct on the part of the creditor claiming parity among other unsecured general creditors") See also United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 540 (1996) 117 This is where control by a lender becomes important, as without control a lender could not opportunistically breach a contract 118 Circuit, 1996) priority rule 121 for those cases where the lender did not incur in any fraudulent or misrepresenting behavior. The absolute priority rule codifies a judge-made rule providing that any plan of reorganization in which claimholders of lower priority obtain payment when claimholders of higher priority are not fully compensated is invalid. 122 And exactly this is the scope of what can be achieved, at least for voluntary creditors, when lender control liability theories are restricted by the explicit nexus of contracts theory and agency law notions of negative control.
Only after we move away from the explicit nexus of contracts paradigm, can lender control liability theories regain a proper role. Their role should be to penalize selfserving behavior that a controlling lender imposed on the firm when that behavior runs counter to socially desirable behavior. In practical terms, lender control liability should work in a similar way as compensatory liability work under general tort law theory:
lender control liability should impose a penalty ex post which would make the lender take efficient actions ex ante. 123 Such an understanding would be consistent with the idea championed by Professor Shavell that damages basically should operate to achieve only optimal deterrence of injurers.
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Although broadening the scope of lender control liability theories permits to reposition them in such a way as to promote socially efficient decisionmaking by the controlling lender, it should be noted that their effect over a party with the ability to make relationship specific investments is limited. Lender control liability theories impose a penalty on a lender whose strategy was self serving, but this doesn't fully restore the incentives of a service provider to invest in order to achieve the first best. There are cases when even though the impact of lender control liability will cause the controlling lender to ex post act in a socially efficient manner, the amount of relationship specific 121 See 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) ("the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest any property") 122 See In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 463 (2 nd Circuit, 2007) 123 Recently, Baird and Rasmussen have called to reconsider the role of lender control liability theories in order to promote the ex ante incentives of lenders to monitor and control the debtors when it is efficient for them to do so. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert. K. Rasmussen "The Prime Directive", 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 921, 939-40 (2007) 124 See Steven M. Shavell "Strict Liability versus Negligence", 9 Journal of Legal Studies 1, 2-9 (1980) investments will be smaller than the social optimal. Nonetheless, it is not clear whether in these later situations having a controlling lender would be worse or better than having the debtor remain in control.
125 Therefore, imposing liability on a lender merely for gaining control doesn't seem appropriate.
It should be noted, nevertheless, that the prescribed role for lender control could not be fully achieved if the agency law formalistic distinction between positive and negative control is not dropped. This categorization seems to have little to do with reality 195 (1996) . Langevoort has defended the idea that introducing outside directors may help to limit inside corporate directors' overoptimism. The same argument could be used in favor of lender control. See Donald C. Langevoort "The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability", 89 Geo. L.J. 797, 803 (2001) 126 Agency law has had this distinction even before the appearance of the explicit nexus of contracts theory of the firm, as can be seen on section 14(o) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency Law (1958) . Nonetheless, it could be argued that the emergence of this theory has served to support this categorization. It could be argued, though, that the negative control category is, argued other contexts an "attempt to avoid relying on hindsight by identifying an ex ante norm to apply." See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski "Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?", 79 Or. L. Rev. 61, 72 (2000) 127 See John C. Joyce "Lender Liability: The Problem Is still with Us", 115 Banking L. J. 477, 483 (1998 This section will analyze damage assessments to show that control based theories need to cope not just with hindsight bias but also with anchoring.
A. Hindsight Bias and Anchoring
A common argument against lender control liability comes from the perils of unevenly heard cases by both juries and judges. This fear is associated to the inability of adjudicators, juries and judges, to correctly understand business decisionmaking (i.e. due to their lack of expertise on the matter) and the likelihood that they will incur in systematic errors due to cognitive biases. 128 The former criticism is largely limited by the specificity of bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction. The later problem, hindsight bias, seems to remain strong.
The risk of opinions tainted by hindsight bias, in connection with the strict liability character of lender control liability theories, has generated sharp criticism. For example, Hynes believes that it creates a dilemma for a controlling creditor: "The more critical the financial condition of a business, the more control the creditor will want to assert in an effort to keep the business in a state of solvency and thus able to repay its
debts. Yet the more control the creditor asserts, the greater risk it runs under the common law of agency of incurring personal liability for the debts of the business". Circuit, 1977) ("Absolute measures of capital inadequacy, such as the amount of stockholder equity or other figures and ratios drawn from the cold pages of the corporation's balance sheets and financial statements, are of little utility, for the significance of this data depends in large part upon the nature of the business and other circumstances. Nor is the fact of eventual failure an appropriate test. This would be tantamount to ruling that an investor who takes an active role in corporate affairs must advance to his corporation all of the funds, which hindsight discloses it needed to survive.") 129 See J. Dennis Hynes "Lender Liability: The Dilemma of the Controlling Creditor", 58 Tenn. L. Rev. 635, 637-8 (1991) . Hynes' understanding of the lender liability problem is centered on agency costs, relying on the famous phrase of Justice Learned hand in Admiral Oriental Line v. United States expressing that "The doctrine stands upon the fact that the venture is the principal's, and that, as the profits will be his, so should be the expenses. " See Admiral Oriental Line v. United States, 86 F.2d 201, 202 (Second Circuit, 1936) . 130 For a definition of the business judgment rule, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski "A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight", 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 571, 619 (1998) Another well-known cognitive error is referred to as anchoring. Tversky and Kahneman define anchoring as the bias which occurs when people make estimates depending on an irrelevant starting point. 139 Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich consider that "[a]nchors affect judgment by changing the standard of reference that people use when making numeric judgments." 140 Anchoring derives from the difficult problem of disregarding known information. 141 Wistrich, Guthrie and Rachlinski provide three theories to help explain this phenomenom: motivation, ironic process theory and mental contamination. Motivation implies that people told to disregard information may increase their desire to attend to it, a concept researchers refer to as "psychological reactance".
Ironic process theory poses that even if individuals want to ignore information, they may find it difficult to avoid thinking about information they want to ignore. Mental contamination appears because the brain does not compartmentalize gathered information. Then, this information may affect their judgment by influencing how subsequent events are processed and which beliefs are formed. The strength of the anchoring effect has been shown to be negatively correlated to the confidence the evaluator has in its own assessment (i.e. "when people are not confident in their judgments, they are more susceptible to anchoring effects"), a confidence which Sunstein, Kahneman and Schkade believe to be low when awarding dollar amounts.
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Anchoring has been empirically observed in many diverse fields. 143 Specifically relating to the focus of this paper, Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich have produced three separate studies on anchoring effects in federal magistrates, state and federal judges and bankruptcy judges. 144 The first study was conducted over a sample of federal magistrate judges who were asked to assess damages arising out an accident. They found that their sample group is also subject to anchoring, 145 despite the fact that "judges are experienced, well-trained, and highly motivated decision makers". 146 The second study, a similar damage assessment case, was conducted over a sample of federal magistrates,
state and federal judges and tested anchoring effects with both low and high anchors.
They found that both anchors had a significant impact on the amount of damages awarded. In the third study, bankruptcy judges faced a determination of interest rate in a chapter 13 case. Although, the results were smaller, anchoring still had an impact on the outcome. 147 To the best of my knowledge, there has not been any study yet connecting anchoring to control related liability theories.
B. Damage Assessments: the Role of Anchoring
Despite the criticism voiced against strict liability when applied to controlling lenders, it has been advanced as a way to reduce the problems presented by hindsight bias in cases where "the technology of precaution is unilateral (in the sense that only the potential injurer can realistically take action to reduce the probability or severity of an accident)". 148 Lender control liability appears to fit the bill, as usually only the controlling lender is responsible for decisions affecting the outcome (i.e. whether to liquidate or reorganize).
Theoretically, strict liability insulates injurers from the possibility of hindsight bias because the party who may potentially damage another assesses the situation ex ante, as he is always found liable, and doesn't have to pay attention to ex post determinations of probabilities. To see why, it is convenient to look at the standard unilateral tort model of law and economics. 149 In the model, there are two variables: injurers' activity level z (chosen by injurers) and the level of care x which they can engage in. The activity level will generate benefit b(z) and the level of care generates a probability of harm p(x). In addition, it is assumed that x represents the private cost of an injurer deriving from prevention and that h, a fixed value, represents the possible damage caused by the injurer each time an injurer engages in his activity. Then, the social object would be to
which is advanced as the main rationale legal system should have. A potential injurer then prefers to be judged by strict liability when there's a possibility of hindsight bias, as he erases the possibility that adjudicators determine that x generates a larger probability of accident than it actually did. The potential injurer will know ex ante the values of x, p(x) and h and therefore will maximize (1) without the need to pay attention to anything else. Hence, efficient activity and care levels are taken irrespective of hindsight bias.
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It doesn't necessarily follow that strict liability should be applied to liability assessments against controlling parties (as lenders) as a way to prevent hindsight bias.
Speaking of the functionally related BJR, Rachlinski considers that while it works as a "no liability" rule it is as an efficient way to achieve a second best in dealing with hindsight bias. 151 Rachlinski provides both "equitable and economic" reasons to use a no liability rule in the case of the BJR. The later arguments refer to the disincentive that a strict liability would pose on people to become firm's managers and the incentives to take excessive precautions, in turn undermining general economic activity. 152 The former arguments focus on shareholders ability to fire managers directly or indirectly by selling their stock, the limited amount of loss suffered by shareholders and their ability to diversify their risk of loss.
Regardless of whether the Rachlinski's BJR analysis can be extended to lender control liability, 153 the inability to trust adjudicators on liability assessments is due to a separate cause. Where lender control liability theories are involved, the superior characteristic of strict liability in unilateral torts doesn't apply due to the difference in the formation of damage assessments. As it can be readily seen from the unilateral tort model description, the level of damages is entirely independent from the level of care exercised by the potential injurer, which in turn determines the probability of harm. This is not the case for lender control liability theories. An example will help to show the difference.
Let's assume that a controlling lender has 2 options 154 : he can either liquidate the firm (obtaining a fixed amount L) or reorganize it. If he chooses the reorganization option, he will incur for sure in reorganization costs C (i.e. negotiation costs, costs of running the firm until a plan is approved, etc) and may obtain a favorable reorganization value R + with a probability p(R + ) or an unfavorable reorganization value R -with probability p (R   -) . Therefore, a controlling lender decides on a course of action depending on whether L is bigger or smaller than
Let's assume, further, that the controlling lender chooses option L, the state of the world that realizes is the favorable one (R + ) and then he is sued under lender control liability. If the adjudicator is to rule in favor of the plaintiff he will need to assess the amount of damages (which by assumption are traceable to the controlling lender's decision). To accomplish the damage evaluation, the adjudicator needs to compare L to its assessment of the ex ante result of reorganization, given by (2). Provided that the later is bigger than the former, the controlling lender would have to pay damages equal to that difference. 155 As L is fixed (whatever is obtained in the liquidation of the firm's assets), then the damage assessment will depend on the estimated value of the reorganization.
To obtain such a value, three values need to be estimated: the probabilities of each state of the world occurring, the costs of restructuring and the value of reorganizations. It is safe to assume that courts can estimate rather accurately restructuring costs due to their extended experience in the subject. As we have seen before, probabilities would likely be overestimated due to hindsight bias. Again, strict liability would prevent a controlling lender from suffering ex ante excessive damages if this was the setting. But the estimate of the reorganization value in different states of the world change the picture. In the simple model presented above, R + is given; R -needs to be assessed. Therefore, only if R -is assessed incorrectly, then strict liability may not limit the effects of cognitive biases. R -value may be overestimated not due to hindsight, as it is not a probability, but most likely due to anchoring (produced by R + ).
156 155 We are abstracting here from any damages occurring out reliance in the behavior or words of the controlling lender. 156 Another possibility of bias may be due to representativeness heuristics (i.e. a great description of the firm states of the world) and these estimates are outside of his control (actually decide upon by the adjudicator), strict liability may be an insufficient attempt to achieve an efficient outcome. The efficiency of the outcome of a lender control liability case then depends not just on hindsight bias but also on anchoring, their magnitude of the distortions and maybe the effects of these two heuristics on each other, if any. 157 Recognizing the existence of the combined effects of hindsight bias and anchoring is very important for practical adjudicating and legal policy debiasing efforts. 158 Strategies geared to debias lender control liability adjudications need to pay attention to both hindsight and anchoring. 159 Although both cognitive errors have proven to be very resistant to attempts to limit them, some partial results were obtained using different techniques for debiasing anchoring and hindsight bias. For example, applying a "consider the opposite strategy" has been shown to reduce the anchoring effect 160 and a smaller anchoring effect was found when decision makers were specialized (bankruptcy judges and insurers). 161 In addition, suggested solutions to hindsight bias, as strict liability or eliminating the adjudicator's contact with some evidence 162 may not work in
VI. Conclusion
The In addition, the paper serves to uncover that lender control liability theories are not sufficient to correct all the inefficiencies arising out of allocating control to a lender.
Because allocation of control is not innocuous in chapter 11 reorganizations, some of the effects it posses on ex ante relationship specific investors cannot be corrected by merely penalizing a controlling lender without at the same time penalizing lender's gain of control.
It is yet to be proven that a lender's gain of control is inefficient. On the contrary, the finance literature considers that lenders obtaining control contingent on some imperfect signal is the more efficient state of affairs.
Finally, the paper has exposed that even though lender control may not be optimal, cognitive errors may produce systematic distortions that challenge the application of lender liability theories. Specifically, the paper uncovered that hindsight bias is not the only heuristic which must be taken into account when thinking about lender control liability application. Anchoring plays a substantive role which limits the desirability of applying strict liability as a debiasing technique.
There are several avenues for future research, three of which I outline here. First, as the theory of the firm shows that there may be value not captured by legal claims, it would be interesting to investigate whether bankruptcy definition of claims should be enlarged to incorporate some of these economic factors today not accounted by bankruptcy laws. Second, the relation between different heuristics used in control liability adjudications seems to be a fruitful field for future research. Questions regarding the potential influence of anchoring on hindsight bias or hindsight bias on anchoring or both need to be answered to provide better policy recommendations. In addition, an assessment of the overall effect of heuristics, given the individual variation on cognitive errors, would be especially helpful. 163 Finally, it would be interesting to explore the exactitude of the common assumption in the literature stating that control shifts to the lender after covenant violations. 164 Such a study would help in assessing the magnitude of the societal costs generated by refusing to accept the possibility of lender control costs. 
